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Abstract 
 Corruption is perceived as one of the worst factors inhibiting the state-
building process. It, however, poses a significant threat to young democracies. 
Some theorists argue that, under certain circumstances, corruption might bring 
some benefits that can even overweigh its costs. For example, minorities 
denied certain services that might profit from corruption by bribing their way 
through. This can contribute to lessening tensions between groups. This article 
examines two cases of frozen conflicts and the role corruption might have 
played in the conflict resolution process over the last decade: South Ossetia in 
Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova. After analyzing the "soft approach" of 
the Moldovan state and the "hard power" of the Georgian state towards 
corruption and smuggling on the borders with the secessionist regions, we 
argue that the costs young democracies pay for their unwillingness to combat 
corruption is significantly higher than the modest benefits they can derive 
from handling these challenges with caution2.   
Keywords: Corruption, "frozen conflicts", Moldova, Georgia 
 
Introduction 
 Corruption is usually defined as a perversion, a disease of the political 
system. There is an abundance of forms of corruption, starting from street-
level bribery to "state-capture". Also, definitions of corruption vary widely, 
too. Classification attempts of corruption distinguish among: (1)"black" 
(punished and condemned by the society as a serious violation of moral 
standards and the law), "white" (widely tolerated by the society), and "grey" 
                                                        
2 The authors would like to express gratitude to the Centre for Peace Studies, UiT-the Arctic 
University of Norway, and the DIKU funded Eurasia Peace Studies Exchange (EPSE) 
Network. With their generous support, we managed to conduct interviews and gather material 
in Ukraine and Georgia, received feedback from members of the EPSE network from Norway, 
Ukraine, Germany, and Kyrgyzstan. 
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(corruption that is far less tolerated) (Heidenheimer, 1970); (2) "grass-eating" 
(officials take bribes if offered) and "meat-eating" (officials solicit bribes) 
corruption (Knapp Commission); (3) public office-centered, market-centered, 
and public interest-centered approaches (Holmes, 2015). Dichotomies often 
discussed in the literature include public versus private corruption, petty 
versus grand corruption, passive versus active corruption (Kubbe, 2013). 
 Without going into details of the debate, which of the definitions 
covers all aspects of this worldwide phenomenon? We consider the definition 
shared by Transparency International—"corruption is the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain"—to offer enough clarity to meet the purposes of this 
article. There are no corruption-free states in the world but, usually, a higher 
level of democracy implies less corruption. Most conflict-affected countries 
are among the most corrupt (Le Billon, 2008). Corruption allows the predators 
to exploit the weak and vulnerable. Also, conflict resolution processes are 
slow where officials use their powers for personal gain, instead of serving the 
public benefit. Today, it is universally recognized that "corruption lowers 
economic growth, makes public institutions less efficient, hampers foreign 
investment, undermines trust in the state, and reduces the quality of life for 
billions of people" (Warf, 2019). 
 Corruption in law enforcement, tax administration, and customs pose 
a very dangerous problem. For example, "if corruption reduces government 
revenue, this has detrimental effects on the state's overall capacity to protect 
the populace" (Holmes, 2015). Weak border control is one of the significant 
factors that have contributed to the establishment of various "black markets" 
all over the world, where drugs, weapons, and humans are traded. After the 
downfall of the Soviet Union and war in Yugoslavia, such markets appeared 
in Eastern Europe, too (Moran, 2011). In the process of EU enlargement, 
western European countries were much "concerned that...South-East 
European countries (Bulgaria, Romania) had excessively porous frontiers with 
their non-EU neighbors, largely because of high levels of corruption among 
border guards and customs officers" (Holmes, 2015). 
 However, there are also different approaches to the phenomenon of 
corruption. Following the “grease the wheels” view, some argue that 
corruption improves efficiency by allowing firms to circumvent cumbersome 
bureaucratic processes (Egger & Winner, 2005).3 Indeed, "research on the 
effects of corruption on investments has generated mixed results" (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008). 
 These bold views are not new. In the 1960s, a group of American and 
British scholars argued that corruption is not always a purely negative 
                                                        
3 In contrast, the “sand the wheels” perspective maintains that corruption impedes investment 
by raising the costs and uncertainty (Brouthers et al., 2008; Warf, 2019). 
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phenomenon, after all. Revisionism in corruption studies, as it is referred to, 
suggests that "we move away from moralizing approaches toward corruption 
and instead consider it in rational, functional terms" (Holmes, 2015). A group 
of revisionists, "the so-called functionalists, viewed corruption as a necessary 
vehicle for reinforcing efficiency and fostering economic growth by cutting 
bureaucratic red tape, redistributing resources, improving social welfare, and 
contributing to political development" (Kubbe, 2013). Some forms of 
corruption can help to strengthen political parties, who can benefit from 
governmental corruption and patronage, claimed Samuel Huntington. This is 
normal because modernization is accompanied by corruption since this 
process involves "the expansion of governmental authority and the 
multiplication of the activities subjected to governmental regulation" 
(Huntington, 2007). 
 Joseph Nye considered that (1) under certain circumstances, corruption 
can be used to avoid radicalization of certain disadvantaged groups, "non-
elites", minorities: corruption gives them a chance to access services they are 
usually denied. Allowing these groups to integrate can contribute to avoiding, 
preventing conflicts and tensions in societies that are split on an ethnic, 
religious, or racial basis. Also, (2) corruption can help to promote economic 
development in certain societies by cutting red tape or helping in capital 
formation. Furthermore, (3) corruption can positively influence government 
capacity when those in power do not rely only on coercive measures, 
incentives and make "corrupt material incentives ... a functional equivalent for 
violence" (Nye, 1967). Thus, there is a probability that, under certain 
circumstances, the benefits of corruption can outweigh its costs. 
 Leff also viewed corruption as a lubricant for slow and inefficient 
governmental processes and as a hedge against bad policy. Interestingly, he 
concludes that "preoccupation with corruption can itself become an 
impediment to development". This would be the case if the focus on corruption 
takes away all attention from other political and economic problems and "from 
the measures that can be taken despite corruption" (Leff, 1964). 
 The revisionist approach, and especially this last observation of Leff, 
is central for our research. This is because the analyzed anti-corruption 
campaign of the Georgian Government after the "Rose Revolution" in 2003 is 
often blamed by some analysts to have diverted attention from other 
significant political issues, such as reconciliation efforts in the breakaway 
regions and resulted deterioration of relationships between societies across de 
facto borders. Corruption has been viewed as the main roadblock to reforms 
by many post-Soviet republics since the legacy was extremely burdensome. 
 In the Soviet Union, corruption was part of everyday life. All state 
institutions were deeply involved in informal practices. As a result, ordinary 
citizens didn't trust the state and relied mostly on themselves, or their keen, 
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when confronted even with routine challenges, such as buying household stuff. 
This was especially true in the last decades before the downfall of the Soviet 
Union. Embezzlement, administrative corruption, bribery ("blat" and small 
gifts), abuse of authority, and report padding were widespread even before the 
deficit. In addition, scarcity of goods in the ‘80s made the disastrous depth of 
corruption obvious for the whole world (Schwartz, 1979). 
 Schwarz argued that "corruption in the Soviet Union has the crucial 
function of serving as a substitute for reform of the institutional structure. 
Report padding, abuse of authority, and bribery in limited forms may not be 
ultimate in political development – but they are clearly preferred by the current 
leadership to the alternative of institutional reform" (Schwartz, 1979). Thus, 
prospects for reforms seemed unrealistic to the authors. Old habits die hard 
and a lot of post-Soviet societies show a similar attitude to reforms and 
transformation. 
 Most of these perverse practices were inherited by the 15 independent 
states, often still referred to as post-Soviet states. Almost all of them 
(excluding the three Baltic states) still have high levels of corruption: 
presidents and political elites that govern for decades, violations of human 
rights and freedom of speech, and erosion of state institutions. Since 
corruption is a universally condemned problem, all of these young states have 
made efforts to come into compliance with international legislation. For 
example, they joined and ratified the UN Convention on Corruption or created 
agencies to fight corruption. "Most post-communist regimes have succeeded 
in putting in place the structures of democracy, including many laws and 
regulations designed to limit corruption, yet they rarely work in practice due 
to the lack of enforcement capacity and political will" (Karklins, 2005). Lack 
of political will can usually be traced back to the economic interests of political 
elites, which were often represented by the same persons from the Soviet 
nomenklatura who managed to survive the turbulent ‘90s by rejecting the 
communist ideology.  
 In the ‘90s, the newly established states had to go through experiences 
that differed quite a lot. For instance, countries of the South Caucasus plunged 
into bloody wars and ethnic collisions. Ukraine and Belarus didn't have to go 
through this traumatic experience but, as time showed, neither of these 
countries, neither conflict-affected nor conflict-free, managed to build strong 
state institutions and get rid of corruption. "None of the 15 post-Soviet 
successor states was able to avoid the “transitional slump”, as economists 
euphemistically call the sudden economic collapse in the wake of 
privatization, liberalization, and the breakdown of the Soviet trading system. 
Yet few post-Soviet states were hit as hard as Armenia and Georgia whose 
economic transitions were further aggravated by devastating civil wars 
(Georgia) and an economic blockade (Armenia). Despite these odds, both 
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countries were able to revive their economies by the mid-1990s" (Stefes, 
2006). 
 Building democratic state institutions is a challenge that is 
significantly affected by corrupt networks: ruling elites undermine efforts of 
reforms and use all available leverages to block initiatives that can harm their 
privileges. The weakness of institutions manifests itself in different ways, 
slows down democratization and economic development, and undermines 
security. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have suffered much because of 
fraudulent elections, biased lawmakers, judges, and bureaucrats. Confronting 
an openly aggressive policy from the Russian Federation, these countries led 
a survival game not only against these foreign forces but also against domestic 
enemies. Separatist regions are therefore twice dangerous for these weak 
democracies. 
 Georgia was first to plunge into armed conflict and bloodshed; 
Ukraine, as it was believed, would be able to avoid an open military 
confrontation with Russia; and Moldova managed to avoid escalation of the 
conflict in Transnistria. The approach that Georgia adopted in the case of 
South Ossetia and the approach that Moldova adopted in the case of 
Transnistria are rather different. In the case of Georgia, it can be described as 
a mixture of "hard" and "soft power", which is a "smart power" approach. In 
the case of Transnistria, it is rather "laissez-faire" approach or a decision not 
to intervene. 
 The question we pose following the "revisionist" approach of Nye, 
Jeff, and others is if allowing a certain amount of corruption, like smuggling 
across the borders with secessionist regions, is an acceptable price worth 
paying, if the benefit is a "frozen", violence-free status quo that can lead in a 
long-term perspective to conflict solving. At the same time, we hypothesize 
that this price costs the conflict-struck countries its reputation and endangers 
political and economic development, leading to stagnation and even 
deterioration of political institutions. 
 
De facto South Ossetia and Georgia's "Hard Power" 
 Ethnic conflicts affected the development of the young Georgian state 
in the ‘90s and continue to dominate the political life in the country since its 
independence. For example, the constitution reads that the issues of local self-
government, as well as the model of bicameralism of the Parliament, will be 
decided only after the restoration of territorial integrity. Breakaway regions of 
Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia represent uncontrollable territories run 
by semi-criminal groups connected to Russia. Furthermore, the so-called 
borders with these two regions represent enormous challenges in the field of 
security and development for all Georgian governments. 
European Scientific Journal April 2020 edition Vol.16, No.11 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
51 
 South Ossetia is one of two breakaway regions of Georgia historically 
known as "Samachablo" (See Map N1), a region with a weak economy, 
dependent on subsidies from Tbilisi (after secession on subsidies from 
Russia), and with a high level of ethnic Ossetian-Georgian intermingling 
(Souleimanov, 2013). In the north, South Ossetia borders with Russia, 
connected with the Roki Tunnel, was completed in 1984. After an armed 
conflict in 1991-1992, South Ossetia declared independence and since then, 
together with Abkhazia, seeks international recognition. In the August war of 
2008, South Ossetia made worldwide headlines, when Georgian and Russian 
armed forces clashed in an open full-scale military operation. Thousands of 
Russian soldiers were transported through the Roki Tunnel and engaged in 
military actions far beyond the borders of South Ossetia deep in the Georgian 
territory. Russian troops remain in the region, regularly causing trouble by 
"arresting" Georgian citizens for violation of "state borders" and bringing 
them to Tskhinvali –the capital of South Ossetia– or by making headlines 
because of the "creeping occupation", moving the "state border" deeper into 
Georgian territory.4 
 During the ‘90s, Georgia was extremely ineffective in all directions of 
public policy and, as a result, the borders with the secessionist regions were 
open for all kinds of illegal and criminal activities. Corruption was widespread 
in Georgian law enforcement agencies. Due to corruption and ineffective 
administration from the Georgian side and chaos on the other side, South 
Ossetia presented a paradise for smuggling, theft, kidnapping, before the 
"Rose Revolution" in 2003 brought a new government into power in Tbilisi. 
 Mainly used for smuggling drugs, the borders also presented other 
dangers to the state. Groups of armed people from the North Caucasus crossed 
time after time the state border with Russia for purposes still not clear. Russia 
constantly threatened to fight back "terrorists hiding on the Georgian 
territory". One of the incidents happened in 2002 when "a Chechen rebel force 
of around 200 militants under the command of warlord Ruslan Gelayev broke 
through the border into the Russian region of Ingushetia from the Georgian 
side. Gelayev himself was killed in the ensuing skirmish with federal troops, 
leading to his force back to Georgia by an alternative route through Dagestan 
in December 2004" (Arasli, 2007). 
 Thus, "exposed to the challenging regional geopolitics and without any 
luxury to enjoy the peace dividend, Georgia’s security-related considerations 
were paramount" (Gvindadze, 2017). Overhaul of the law enforcement 
agencies was of the highest importance in the context of the reforms after the 
"Rose Revolution". Otherwise, the system of national security would be 
                                                        
4 See for example: Living on the shifting border of Georgia and Russia -
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/lens/living-on-the-shifting-border-of-georgia-and-
russia.html 
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exposed to dangers. "With the law enforcement entities firmly in the service 
of the state, the authorities were in a position to deploy efficient 
counterintelligence and anti-crime effort and the government reformers felt 
protected when taking on the vested interests” (Gvindadze, 2017). 
 On the wave of the "Rose Revolution" reforms, a serious dilemma 
emerged for the Georgian reformers: the process of building strong institutions 
included reforming the police and border police control, closing all illegal 
ways of trade with the breakaway regions. On the other hand, this would mean 
cutting some communication ways with the population in these regions and 
curbing space for dialogue and interaction remaining for locals on the two 
sides of the "border". 
 Consequently, the new government had ambitious plans of reforming 
the failing Georgian state and securing its borders was an important step in the 
process. "Borders are first and foremost sites and symbols of power” 
(Donnan/Wilson, 1999, p.1). As such, "borders are key locations where the 
state asserts its authority by erecting border and customs posts and by limiting 
the flows of people and goods eligible for transit" (Oltramonti, 2013). 
 According to the official position of the Shevardnadze (Georgian) 
government in Tbilisi before the "Rose Revolution", "Georgian authorities 
have not established border guard and customs service checkpoints in South 
Ossetia since secessionists would immediately interpret this as an attempt to 
establish a new Georgian state border" (Kukhianidze et al., 2007). Smuggling 
was a major source of income for South Ossetia. Georgian criminal groups 
cooperated with the Ossetian criminal groups enabling different goods to flow 
in both directions: drugs, stolen cars, cigarettes, citruses, etc. They also 
guaranteed high income for the local fat cats in South Ossetia and corrupt 
officials in Tbilisi.5 A special role in the scheme was played by the black 
market in the village of Ergneti. The main route for smugglers in the region 
was through the Roki Tunnel from Russia to the "Ergneti Market"6 and further 
to Tbilisi and other parts of Georgia. Goods, such as cars stolen in Tbilisi, 
                                                        
5 "OSCE officials estimate that some $60-$70 million in goods pass through the tunnel each 
year, compared with an official South Ossetian budget of roughly $1 million in both Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia" (King, 2001). 
6 Ergneti itself is a small village, a location where Georgian and Ossetian official 
representatives still meet on regular basis to negotiate current situation in the conflict region. 
"During the 2008 August war, most of the population left the Village, but the overwhelming 
majority of those displaced returned to Ergneti a few weeks to months later, after the retreat 
of the Russian forces and South Ossetian militias. Most houses they returned to had been 
destroyed, and the household and economic assets other than those that they were able to carry 
with them while fleeing the fighting, including livestock, had often been lost, destroyed or 
looted" (Danish Refugee Council, 2013). 
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disappeared in the direction of Ossetia daily and were further transported to 
Russia.7 
 The criminal groups on both sides were influential, with ties in the 
government and public support among locals. For example, a powerful 
gangster from the Georgian side, Khmiadashvili, nicknamed "Robota", led a 
40-member strong gang. With a background in special police forces, backed 
by his cousin in the Regional Police, Khmiadashvili was involved in 
kidnapping, car trafficking, etc. From the Ossetian side, the "black business" 
was protected by the "Sports Mafia", allegedly headed by the chief trainer of 
Russia's freestyle wrestling team. Marek and Erik Dudaev, later well-known 
terrorists, felt free to kill and loot in the best tradition of the Wild West 
(Kukhianidze et al., 2007).8 
 The involvement of Russian troops in the smuggling was also obvious. 
Some researchers even see reasons for the 2008 August Russian-Georgian war 
closely connected with these ties: "Although direct evidence is difficult to 
come by, the scale of these illegal activities suggested the active complicity of 
senior Russian officials, who acted as the criminals' patrons and partners. Of 
course, the conflict was fueled by many factors, including ethnic strife, 
domestic Georgian politics, and Russia's desire to assert its hegemony in its 
near abroad. But it is also conceivable that among the interest groups pushing 
the Kremlin toward war were those involved in lucrative trafficking operations 
in the contested areas" (Naim, 2012). 
 After the 2008 August war, Russians sealed the "borders" of Georgia 
and South Ossetia. Local Georgians who cross the "border" are frequently 
kidnapped for allegedly "unlawful violations of state borders" and kept in 
captivity for longer periods. Usually, the intervention of EU monitors is 
necessary to free them. "An unarmed civilian monitoring mission of the 
European Union" was deployed in September 2008 "following the EU-
mediated Six Point Agreement which ended the August war".9 The mission 
has almost 200 monitors, who are patrolling the region day and night and react 
                                                        
7 "Drug trafficking is an entrenched problem in Georgia because of its location on the transit 
route through the Caucasus. The criminal groups involved in narcotics trafficking in the region 
originate from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya, and Azerbaijan, as well as from other 
former Soviet republics and Turkey" (Traughber, 2007). 
8 The situation was so grave, that even after a major cleansing of the law enforcement 
agencies, there still were serious cases of corruption. "In a significant case in 2006, stolen 
HEU (highly enriched uranium) had reportedly been smuggled from Russia to Georgia with 
the aid of a corrupt border official who was a relative of the principal smuggler, Oleg 
Khintsagov". (Legvold, 2009) 
9 https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/mandate 
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very quickly to incidents, like Georgian citizens arrested by Russian military 
forces.10 
 In 2004, on the wave of the "Rose Revolution," Georgia choose not to 
compromise with the widespread corruption and Saakashvili's government 
closed the Ergneti Black Market; this led to less criminal activities in the 
region and more revenues into the state budget11 (See also Table 1). As a 
result, "South Ossetia" found itself economically trapped. This, as critics say, 
made the Ossetians more desperate and anti-Georgian, leading them to come 
closer with Russia. 
Table 1. 
Source: The Financial, 2018. 
https://www.finchannel.com/world/georgia/76199-mikheil-saakashvili-in-my-time-the-state-
budget-increased-tenfold-whilst-in-ivanishvili-s-time-it-decreased-by-8-in-usd 
  
It was believed that a strong, democratic Georgian state would attract 
the population of separatist regions.12 "An invigorated, wealthy, and 
                                                        
10 The Tasks of the Mission are defined as:  ensuring that there is no return to hostilities; 
facilitating the resumption of a safe and normal life for the local communities living on both 
sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL) with Abkhazia and South Ossetia; building 
confidence among the conflict parties; informing EU policy in Georgia and the wider region. 
Source: https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/facts_and_figures 
11 Closure of Ergneti Black Market Boosted Customs Revenues - 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7734 
12 Georgian anti-corruption reforms were praised worldwide and are described in various 
researches and publications, such as: Fighting corruption in public services: chronicling 
Georgia's reforms (English), World Bank 2012, or L. Holmes, Corruption: A very short 
introduction, Oxford University Press 2015. 
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democratic Georgian state would reassure the populations of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, Saakashvili contended. Instead of living in political limbo of 
an unrecognized state (at least before August 2008), the citizens of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia would receive real political and cultural autonomy within a 
Georgian state. Furthermore, they would benefit from the investment 
potential, increased infrastructure, and a higher standard of living that all 
Georgian citizens would enjoy" (George, 2009). 
 In 2006, an alternative government of South Ossetia was created by 
the Georgian central government.  Led by Dimitri Sanakoyev and his ministers 
(including a minister for foreign affairs), they were to represent those refugees 
who had to leave South Ossetia and were not allowed back to their homes.13 
Sanakoyov, who had fought against Georgia during the conflict in the ‘90s and 
later occupied high positions in the de facto government of Ossetia, was 
expected to give people on both sides of the conflict border a sense that the 
Georgian government is not only showing hard power but is ready for a 
dialogue. "There are more guarantees of developing Ossetian language and 
culture in Georgia than in Russia. I don’t want the Ossetian people to disappear 
from the world political map", announced Sanakoyev.14 
 "The Sanakoyev Project" was an important undertaking for the 
Georgian Government: first, it was a sign that there was a more civilized 
alternative to the corrupt, illegal ways of exchange and trade between people 
of the conflict region. The Sanakoyev government has the support of the 
central government to implement educational, healthcare and cultural events 
for people affected by the conflict. Healthcare has always been the most acute 
issue since there was almost no means to access qualified medical services in 
South Ossetia.15 Second, the success of the alternative government in the 
Ossetian case would be an important sign for Abkhazia, another breakaway 
region of Georgia. If the "soft power" of the Georgian authorities would work 
in Ossetia and progress could be achieved, hope for progress in the Georgian-
Abkhazian conflict resolution could be foreseen too. Although there is no 
dramatic tangible result of this "soft power" approach, in either case, Georgia 
still continues to pursue it for years now hoping to harvest improvement of 
attitudes and perceptions of the "Georgian state" and "Georgians" among 
Abkhaz and Ossetians in the future.16 
                                                        
13 Tbilisi Willing to Formalize S.Ossetia Alternative Government - 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=14224 
14 Sanakoyev: Most Ossetians Support Broad Autonomy -
http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/1405_july_23_2007/n_1405_3.html 
15 Georgia builds modern hospital in Tskhinvali region - 
http://geotimes.ge/_old/archive/index.php?m=home&newsid=5144&lang=eng 
16 “The state hands out grants for university education, and provides free medical assistance 
and benefits,” says Bibilaia. It’s an open secret that people living in the unrecognised republic 
also go to Georgia for their healthcare needs; provision in Abkhazia is not adequate, but to be 
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 Smuggling and criminal activities were also widespread at the 
"borders" of Georgia and Abkhazia, and the central government of Georgia 
being unable to control local and international criminal groups. Hundreds of 
thousands of refugees from Abkhazia (mainly ethnic Georgians) are scattered 
around the country (part of them had left Georgia). The legitimate Government 
of Abkhazia continues to function till now on the territory of Georgia and is 
supposed to be taking care of the affairs connected with the refugees. Today, 
smuggling is still widespread at the Georgian-Abkhaz "border" (a case of child 
trafficking was recently discovered by Georgian authorities).17 This allows the 
locals on both sides to communicate occasionally (under strict control and 
involvement of Russian troops), but the peace-building process has not 
advanced even a bit.18 
 Closedown of the market in Ergneti has become a matter for political 
debates and speculations: cutting the smugglers’ ways. Furthermore, it also 
destroyed opportunities of local farmers to access markets in the North 
(Russia) and left local Georgians and Ossetians without a meeting point. 
Saakashvili's government didn't want to turn a blind eye on corruption in the 
region, but the opposition party "Georgian Dream" (currently in power since 
2012) didn't agree with this approach and made the restoration of the Ergneti 
market one of the promises in the election campaign in 2012. 
 In 2012, President Saakashvili's "National Movement" lost elections 
and a new party, "Georgian Dream", led by a billionaire Bidsina Ivanishvili 
came to power. After winning elections, the new political power criticized the 
aggressive and straightforward approach of the previous government and, in 
2013, repeated the promise to restore the Ergneti market and try to create a 
space where Georgian and Ossetians could meet19. The fact is that the 
Georgian Dream never managed to hold this promise. 
 Looking back at revisionists’ arguments about the benefits of 
corruption outweighing the costs under certain circumstances, we can ask the 
                                                        
seen by a Georgian doctor, you’ll need a Georgian passport. Many people try to keep this 
quiet, she continues, as they might get into trouble at home. At the moment, Ukraine is trying 
to set up a similar scheme for citizens who continue to live in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk". 
Source: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/neither-here-nor-there-georgian-refugees-
from-abkhazia/ 
17https://oc-media.org/ukrainian-woman-heading-to-abkhazia-arrested-on-suspicion-of-
child-trafficking/ 
18 Georgian government allows cigarette smuggling from Abkhazia, Gali residents say- 
https://dfwatch.net/georgian-government-allows-cigarette-smuggling-from-abkhazia-gali-
residents-say-52578 
19 Georgia considers reopening Ergneti market- 
https://dfwatch.net/georgia-considers-reopening-ergneti-market-56569-30209, also Ergneti 
Market to be Restored: But at What Cost?- 
http://old.georgiatoday.ge/article_details.php?id=12535 
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question if the "South Ossetian" case was an example of this: would preserving 
Ergneti Black Market be possible without sacrificing internal stability and 
economic development in Georgia? Was the benefit from the informal 
communication between Georgians and Ossetians higher than/worth the cost 
that the Georgian state was paying when allowing a black market function? 
Did Moldova choose a better approach in Transnistria and avoided escalation 
of the conflict by turning a blind eye on certain corruption in law enforcement 
agencies? 
 
Transnistrian Moldovan Republic and Moldova's "Soft Power" 
 Transnistria is one of the "frozen conflict zones", de facto states in the 
post-Soviet space. A breakaway region of Moldova, Transnistria, doesn't 
border with Russia but is backed and supported by Russia (See Map N2). 
Sandwiched between Moldova and Ukraine, Transnistria struggles for 
international recognition. So far, only self-proclaimed states such as Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh have done so. A very similar scenario 
as in Georgia has developed here after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
when Moscow backed separatists, plunged the country into a civil war.  
 A military confrontation between Transnistrian separatists and the 
official forces of the Moldovan government started in 1992. Separatists, 
supported by the Russian fourteenth army, received weapons, guidance, and 
even soldiers from the Russian military base. In clashes in Benderi, a town 
close to Tiraspol, several hundreds of people lost their lives (Katchanovski, 
2014). Around one thousand dead, five hundred wounded, and a hundred 
thousand refugees were reported in this hot phase of the conflict (Kuchler, 
2008). 
 General Alexander Lebed, also notoriously well known in Georgia, in 
his pretense to prevent violence, "ordered the bombardment of the Moldovan 
troops to stop their advance on Transdnistria" (Katchanovski, 2014). Indeed, 
violence has stopped, and Transdnistria found the protection of Russian 
military bases. Since then, Russia claims to be on a "peacekeeping mission" 
in the region, backing the puppet regime in Tiraspol and planning to remain in 
the region indefinitely (Kuchler, 2008). 
 Over time, what was supposed to become "little Switzerland"20 became 
a den of criminals, flooded with weapons. "The Moldovan region of 
Transnistria is flooded with criminal groups and illegal arms dealers, with 
transnational criminal and terrorist organizations skillfully using these 
separate sectors to their advantage. The most dangerous organized criminal 
                                                        
20 Transnistria: the price of unilateral independence - 
https://www.equaltimes.org/transnistria-the-price-of?lang=en#.XWfMnS4za01 
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operations are creating their military units and illegally producing and selling 
arms and explosives" (Busuncian, 2007). 
 Transnistria is not the only challenge for Moldova. However, residents 
of the Autonomous Territorial Unit – Gagauzia – are under the total influence 
of Russian propaganda and according to the 2014 referendum, see their future 
only with Russia (Saran, 2018). Balti Municipality also showed some signs of 
separatism, anti-European sentiments fueled by pro-Russian local figures 
(Saran, 2018).  
 Russia maintains control over Transnistria through economic, 
political, and military leverages; provides funding for social purposes, like 
pensions, since 2008; Russian "Gazprom" supplies gas to the local 
"TiraspolTransGaz" free of charge; energy resources provided to locals below 
market prices help to generate revenues from local businesses, helping the 
local budget keep floating (Kermach, 2017). A referendum was held in 
Transnistria in 2016 where 98.07 voted for independence and potential 
integration with Russia. 
 Moldova's policy towards the separatist region can be described as 
"soft power": official Chisinau allows economic agents from Transnistria to 
conduct legal foreign trade to export goods and enjoy all the benefits of the 
free trade agreements Moldova has signed with the EU (DCFTA) (Kermach, 
2018).21 Registration in the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Moldova is 
necessary, though taxes paid by the agents go to the budget of Transnistria. 
Also, residents of Transnistria in most cases have triple citizenship – Russian, 
Moldovan, Transnistrian – allowing them freedom of movement. Neighboring 
Ukraine, with a rather weak border control and high level of corruption, made 
smuggling (cigarettes, agriculture products, etc.) an excellent source of 
income for the locals for many years. Currently, "football diplomacy" is 
widely discussed as an alternative form of bringing people from both sides of 
the Dnistr river together again. Thus, these charity matches allow Moldovans, 
Russians, and Ukrainians living on both sides of the conflict to meet and make 
politicians proud and hopeful that peace is still possible in the region.22 
 Transnistria also borders with Ukraine that had to experience a very 
similar scenario of what happened in Georgia earlier. In 2014, secessionist 
forces, supported by Russia, provoked in the Donbas region a military conflict 
which plunged the country into a war that has a tremendous influence on the 
political and economic development of the whole country. For Ukraine, this is 
probably even more problematic than for Georgia, since a large part of the 
country, Crimea, has already been occupied. Besides, political instability in 
                                                        
21 In response, in 2014, backed by Russia, Transnistria and Gagauzia started looking for closer 
economic ties with Russia, refusing to "bite the bait" and get closer to Moldova (Ivan, 2014). 
22 How football brought Moldova and Transnistria together, despite 27 years of frozen conflict 
- https://www.calvertjournal.com/features/show/11180/moldova-transnistria-football-union 
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the country has left its influence, in that, the level of corruption is much higher 
in Ukraine than in Georgia. Transparency International ranked Georgia 46th 
and Ukraine 130th in 2017 in the annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
 Similar to Georgia, Ukraine has two major problematic places at the 
borders. One of these is already in flames and the Russian aggression shows 
no signs of diminishing. The other vulnerable place for Ukraine is the border 
with Moldova. An unrecognized territory with a pro-Russian government, 
Transnistria, poses threats in various directions for Ukraine. Regarding high 
levels of corruption among Ukrainian law enforcement agencies (border 
police is usually among the most corrupt), the question is if the country can 
control the border and this "smugglers' paradise" and avoid potential 
provocations. 
 Recent joint efforts by Moldovan and Ukrainian governments to 
control the border have sparked anger in Transnistria, accusing Ukraine of 
blockading them. Backed by Moscow, Transnistria is not shy of complaining 
and threatening Kiev: “I think that Russia and Transnistria will now raise their 
bets and protest against the [new checkpoint],”23 as the leader of the 
unrecognized republic. Also, previously “when pro-Western President Viktor 
Yushchenko came to power after Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, he imposed 
tough customs controls on the border with Transnistria.” Russia, which sends 
assistance through Ukraine, has deplored these as an “economic embargo” 
(Sanchez, 2009). 
 Not surprisingly, "borders" of the de facto states pose a serious threat 
not only for the two countries but for the European Union as well. Having a 
neighbor like Transnistria, in such proximity, is uncomfortable not only for 
Romania, sharing a border with Moldova and Ukraine, but other European 
states as well. Smuggling, trafficking, and illegal migration raise serious 
concerns in this region. 
 "Transnistria is a security issue for Europe due to the organized crime 
that occurs, including ongoing human rights violations at the hands of the 
mafia-style “government” of Voronin and his family and entourage. During a 
visit to Transnistria, reporter Simon Reeve for the British daily The Mirror 
said that “Transnistria has a Wild West feel and is a centre for smuggling […]. 
Even Interpol doesn’t operate there” (Sanchez, 2009). 
 Moreover, there is evidence that Transnistria posed serious threats not 
only to the region but could also cause global troubles. "According to an 
investigation by British journalists, any person ‘whether a political terrorist or 
religious fanatic’ who possesses a necessary sum of money can easily acquire 
weapons in Transnistria that can pose a contamination threat to millions of 
                                                        
23 https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/black-market-state-have-ukraine-and-moldova-cornered-a-
separatist-smugglers-paradise 
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people. The British journalists came very close to purchasing Soviet 
radioactive devices in Transnistria for USD 167,000 per item" (Busuncian, 
2007). 
 As expected, next to this "black hole", countries like Romania felt 
uncomfortable. "... the continuing crisis in the Transnistrian region forced 
Romania to recognize Russia as an immediate threat to its security. These 
factors, taken together, narrowed Romania's foreign policy options 
substantially. The Iliescu regime saw no alternative but to forge the closest 
possible relationship with NATO as protection against Russia" (Kaufman & 
Bowers, 1998). 
 Romania was accused by Russian propaganda of alleged military 
support of Moldova in the Transnistrian conflict already in the 1990s. 
Therefore, "for a long time Romania didn't perform as an active player in the 
process of peaceful settlement ...due to the fact that active Romanization of 
Moldova of early 1990s that became one of catalyst of the conflict with the 
left bank part of the country created the contradictory image of Bucharest and 
negative initiate conditions for interference" (Shelest, 2011). 
 A possible merger of Romania and Moldova due to their close cultural 
ties has been an issue of discussion for a long time, irritating Russia and 
contributing to adding tensions to the relationships between Romania and 
Russia.24 Russia refused on many occasions to withdraw military basis from 
the region and stands behind anti-Romanian propaganda in Moldova. 
Romania, on its side, tried to apply leverages to support anti-Russian 
sentiments in the region. Especially, as an EU member, Romania has its 
agenda in the region and has in different years tried to look for alternative 
formats of cooperation with involved actors (Shelest, 2011).25 
 The EU can play an important if not a decisive role in the conflict 
settlement: aiding Moldova's democratization, making Moldova more 
attractive in economic and social terms for Transnistrians26, replacement of 
peace-keeping forces can become a most realistic scenario for future conflict 
resolution (Maksymenko, 2011) (A similar model is often put on the table by 
experts in the cases of Abkhazian and Ossetia conflicts.) Unfortunately, for 
                                                        
24 "When a nation has the opportunity to be together, it should not give up. It may not happen 
straightaway, but it will happen one day, because blood is thicker than water. I think this is 
the right time to say that we have this objective, if Moldovan people want this. I am convinced 
that if Moldova wants to unite, then Romania will accept"-Romanian President Traian 
Basescu announced in 2013. Source: https://reconsideringrussia.org/2014/04/04/moldova-
and-transnistria-an-overview/ 
25 Interview with Hannah Shelest. 
26 In 1991, Romania passed a law granting citizenship to the descendants of Romanian citizens 
expatriated or dispossessed of their citizenship during Soviet rule. After Romania had joined 
the EU, as expected, being citizen of Romania became a very attractive prospect for many. 
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two decades now, Russia manages to come up with different scenarios of how 
to prevent these from happening.27 
 In 2005, the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova 
and Ukraine was established for border control. The mission has the aims: 1) 
to contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict by 
supporting the development of Transnistria-related confidence-building 
measures and approximation of legislation and procedures in customs, trade, 
transport, and trans-boundary management; 2) to ensure the full 
implementation of Integrated Border Management (IBM) practices at the 
Moldova-Ukraine border; 3) to assist Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities to 
combat cross-border crime more effectively (See the webpage of the mission 
for more).28 Out of 67 border crossing points, 25 are at the Transnistria-
Ukraine part of the border. The mission doesn't have executive powers, but it 
is a neutral advisory consultative body.29 
 As we see, there is a variety of actors involved in the Transnistrian 
case: Moldova, Transnistrian separatists, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, and the 
EU. For the given moment, an existing 5+2 format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE 
as intermediaries, Moldova and Transnistria as conflict parties and USA and 
EU as observers) is believed to guarantee the protection of the human rights 
and ethnic minorities, as well as Moldova's sovereignty and provide a special 
status for Transnistria. Ukraine, the closest neighbor sharing borders with 
Moldova, has always tried to contribute to confidence-building between two 
sides and peaceful settlement, basing its approach on the "principles of 
inviolability of the generally recognized inter-state border of Europe" (Orlov, 
2011). 
 
Discussion 
Can Georgia Learn from the Transnistrian Case? 
 For the research purpose of this article, we have selected two cases: 
Transnistria and South Ossetia.30 There is one significant aspect of these two 
cases that made us concentrate on these two and not discuss other frozen 
conflicts existing in the regions discussed (Abkhazia, for example). Both, 
Transnistria and South Ossetia, see their future as part of the Russian 
Federation; both, strive for becoming part of Russia, while Abkhazia has 
                                                        
27 Interview with Iryna Maksymenko. 
28 http://eubam.org/ 
29 Interview with Slawomir Pichor. 
30 In order to collect data for our research, we conducted semi-structured interviews with a 
number of scholars, politicians and head of the EUBAM mission; all selected respondents 
have previously worked, or currently work on corruption, or conflict resolution issues. Odesa 
was selected since the headquarters of the EUBAM mission is located in the city; Odesa region 
borders Transnistria; local scholars intensively work on the border control and corruption 
issues.  
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declared an intention to free itself from any kind of dependence and become 
an independent state. Becoming part of Russia is not considered a desirable 
scenario.31 
 Conflicts, discussed in this article, like any other similar conflicts, 
usually deal with a variety of external and internal factors and involved actors 
that make comparative studies a specifically complicated undertaking. 
Numerous influential countries, with their geopolitical aims and governments 
with their agenda, try to influence policies and make the best out of chaos in 
the conflicting regions. Besides, the ethnic, cultural, religious diversity of the 
discussed regions turn the process of conflict resolution and reconciliation into 
a Sisyphean task. 
 In the cases of Transnistria and South Ossetia, an abundance of 
involved actors turns the discussion of future scenarios of development into a 
rather speculative task. In the South Ossetian conflict, there are several active 
actors: South Ossetia, Georgia, Russia, EU, USA, and international 
organizations. In the Transnistrian case, it gets even more complicated: 
Transnistria, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, EU, USA, and international 
organizations who are actors and stakeholders in the process of conflict 
resolution (Urse, 2008). The "Russian factor" has proven to be decisive over 
the last decades because whatever efforts the sides of the conflict make to start 
a peaceful process of negotiations and reconciliation, Russia makes aggressive 
and disruptive steps to signal to its interests in the game. 
 Despite all the similarities between the cases of Transnistria and South 
Ossetia, the main being, of course, Russia openly backing separatist forces and 
creating obstacles for dialogue,32 there are several significant aspects of the 
conflicts that have to be taken into account in a comparative effort. 
 First, Ukraine and Moldova enjoy a peaceful neighborhood and 
cooperate on joint border patrolling and other issues. Unlike this, Georgia and 
Russia have no diplomatic relations since 2008. Russia is referred to as "the 
occupant" by all major Georgian political actors. Also, Georgia is considered 
by Russian establishment and media as a "fascist" state that organized an 
ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia. There is practically no chance that two 
countries will manage to cooperate on border patrolling in South Ossetia 
                                                        
31 Interview with Nino Pavlenishvili. 
32 For example, "In an attempt to perhaps gain some publicity and support, as well as to 
demonstrate Moscow’s support for their cause, Smirnov, as well as Abhkazia’s “President” 
Sergey Bagapsh and South Ossetia’s “President” Eduard Kokoyty, appeared together on 
Russia’s Channel One Europe TV in November 2006. In the Russian Television program 
called Judge for Yourselves, the three leaders made a case for the self-determination and 
independence of their respective states, arguing that these secessionist movements were “a 
defense mechanism against our annihilation" (Sanchez, 2009). 
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because what Russia considers as a state border, for Georgia, it is just an 
artificially created separation line between Georgian regions. 
 The second aspect is the geographic context: Georgia and South 
Ossetia are located far from the democratic world. External actors, such as the 
EU, are not in an immediate neighborhood. In the case of Transnistria, the EU 
is actively involved in border control since the situation on the border between 
Moldova and Ukraine can seriously affect security issues within the EU 
countries (Ukraine also borders with Romania, a member state of the EU). 
Therefore, in the Transnistrian case, Moldova and Ukraine profit from the 
neighborhood of the democratic states to the west, while Georgia is left face 
to face with a neighbor who is an aggressor, openly bullying the weak states 
in its neighborhood.33 
 Third, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict was of ethnic character and left 
deep scars and traumas on both sides. Transnistrian conflict, in contrast, was 
not of ethnic nature. After the 2008 war, the alienation of Georgians and 
Ossetians has only increased. In Transnistria, economic factors seem to be 
playing a significant role in bringing people together. 
 Fourth, South Ossetia is economically fully dependent on Russia 
because the region has only a poorly developed agricultural economy that was 
never enough to feed it. Today, there is a Russian military base and the 
majority of Ossetians left in the region work for the base. Transnistria, on the 
other hand, produces goods that have a perspective to find customers not only 
in Ukraine or Moldova but even in the EU. Transnistria's external trade shows 
annual growth: textiles, footwear, machinery, agricultural products, etc. find 
their way to external markets, more than half of these goods ending in 
European markets, the rest in Russia and others.34 Therefore, for Transnistria, 
the European market is a huge incentive, while for South Ossetia, it is not even 
a distant perspective. 
 And last: "Transnistria does not have a deep historical relationship 
with Moldova. Unlike Georgia’s conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
in which the Georgians attach deep emotional and historical significance to 
their breakaway regions, the same really cannot be said for Transnistria and 
Moldova. Transnistria was attached to Moldova proper in 1940 and thus was 
only associated with it for 52 years until its secession in 1992. Compare that 
to the Georgian-Abkhazian or Georgian-Ossetian relationships which extend 
back several centuries into history. Indeed, most Moldovans, according to 
                                                        
33 This aspect has been discussed by other researchers too due to its' importance. "Moldova is 
lucky in this sense that it does not physically border Russia, however, its armed forces are too 
weak to stand up to the 14th Army. This may explain why Voronin has (in recent years) 
pursued Western support but has avoided, unlike Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili, hinting at a 
new military confrontation with Tiraspol" (Sanchez, 2009). 
34 EUBAM, Annual Report, 1 December 2016-30 November 2017. 
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various opinion polls, are indifferent toward Transnistria. For the vast 
majority, the issue ranks as the ninth or tenth priority for the population of 
Moldova proper. According to one observer, “this stands in striking contrast 
to the much higher preoccupation with frozen conflicts in other post-Soviet 
countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia.”35 
 In the case of Transnistria's frozen conflict, we have witnessed a rather 
long time without violence. At the first glance, the soft approach by Moldova 
aimed at confidence-building, and rapprochement is successful and even if not 
leading to solving the problem (see referendum results in Transnistria), at 
least, manages to protect citizens from bloodshed. For Georgia, where the 
2008 war has deteriorated most of the threads of communication between 
people, Moldova's policy might seem like an attractive alternative to the 
previous policies. 
 However, several aspects of the Transnistrian and Ossetian separatism 
give a reason for skepticism. Differences described previously are not the only 
factors for this skeptical vision: the main question here is if the "soft power" 
policy of Chisinau is a well-thought-out strategy of the political actors with 
clear goals or a sign of low political will and inability to confront the 
challenge. 
 Experts claim that corrupt interests of business and political elites hide 
behind the "hybrid" policy of Moldova.36 This speaks rather about the 
weakness of the Moldovan state. In this case, the calm, peaceful tranquility in 
the Transnistrian region is rather a big deception hiding the uncomfortable 
truth that (1) local elites are getting rich in the status quo and (2) it is not in 
Russia's interest to stir up the situation in Moldova since it also feels content, 
or doesn't feel significant threats to its russification policy. However, Russia 
can turn the frozen conflict into a war zone if it sees an armed conflict 
promising benefits exceeding the expenses of maintaining the status quo. This 
can happen if Moldova starts implementing anti-corruption reforms, with the 
aim of closer integration with the EU, for example. Romania can play a 
significant role here, but it has its challenges in the field of accountable and 
transparent governance. 
 Meanwhile, Transnistria remains a republic in limbo, "a Soviet 
Disneyland" as some bloggers call it, posing threat to its neighbors. For 
example, in 2014, Ukraine expected Transnistria as another potential direction 
of Russian aggression, as it happened in Georgia during the August War in 
2008 when Russian forces attacked Georgia not only from South Ossetia but 
also from Abkhazia. 
                                                        
35 Moldova and Transnistria: An Overview - 
https://reconsideringrussia.org/2014/04/04/moldova-and-transnistria-an-overview/ 
36 Interview with Artem Filipenko. 
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 Transnistria and South Ossetia can be described as criminal states 
(though, South Ossetia with its current population of 8 thousand and a Russian 
military base of 12 thousand cannot be called even that).37 "The criminal state 
... refers to places not merely where criminal activity has penetrated widely 
within the state, but where the core activity of the state is criminal; that is, 
where the state depends overwhelmingly on the returns from illicit trade to 
finance itself and, therefore, not only protects, but, in fact, conducts the bulk 
of the business ... several of the so called de facto mini-states left in the wake 
of separatist struggles within the post-Soviet states—Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in Georgia, Transdniestr in Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh in 
Azerbaijan—fit this description" (Legvold, 2009). 
 None of the actors of the Transnistrian conflict are interested in taking 
steps to solve this puzzle: Moldova, "despite its official non-recognition of 
Transnistria actually serves as one of the sponsors of its economic 
sustainability along with Russia" (Kermach, 2017). Transnistrians are allowed 
to conduct legal foreign trade on behalf of the Republic of Moldova, but pay 
taxes to the Transnistrian budget. Transnistrian business legalized in the 
Moldovan legal framework enjoys all the benefits of DCFTA, an agreement 
Moldova has signed with the EU. Also, more than 107 thousand Transnistrians 
hold citizenship of Moldova (Kermach, 2017).  
 Thus, this peace seems to be rather fragile. While the "soft approach" 
is supposed to give in the long run positive results, such as confidence-building 
between two sides, one still has to keep in mind (1) the Russian factor and (2) 
the stable, if not progressing weakness of the Republic of Moldova as an 
independent state. The first factor simply implies that Russia can use levers to 
stir up the situation despite the efforts of Moldova to keep a good relationship 
with Transnistrians. This is because the resources that Russia can allocate are 
so much significant than Moldova's resources even if supported by Romania, 
for example. Secondly, according to different worldwide ranking and 
researches, Moldova is among states with very low progress, or even slight 
levels of regress in democratization and economic development: ranked 47th 
in the "doing business rankings"38; 4.93 score according to the Nations in 
Transit Report (score 7 being the worst; See Table 2)39, and extremely low 
ranking in the TI Corruption Perception Index.40 
 
                                                        
37 Interview with Paata Davitaia. Other experts gave slightly higher numbers, but all agree that 
the number of Ossetian population is extremely low. 
38 Rankings & Ease of Doing Business Score - http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings 
39 https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/moldova 
40 In 2017 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index Georgia is ranked 46 
(score 56), Ukraine 130 (score 30)40 and Moldova 122 (score 31); Russia ranked 135th (score 
29). See also, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 
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Table 2. Nations in Transit data  
Georgia 
 
Moldova 
 
 In this context, the "soft" approach of the Moldovan side seems rather 
as an unwillingness or inability to deal with problems. A similar approach 
could be fatal for the young Georgian state in 2004, especially regarding 
factors such as Russia being just next door, having no neighbors that are 
democracies and EU members, and ethnic tensions between Georgians and 
Ossetians being still fresh in memory. According to the Freedom House's 
Nations in Transit data, despite the 2008 war, Georgia has better results in the 
democracy score than Moldova, which can only be explained by the successful 
anti-corruption reforms. 
 The Economist Democracy Index (EDI) is another tool to measure how 
countries are doing in terms of combating corruption and what kind of regimes 
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they represent (see Table 3). In 2017, both countries scored 5.94, but in the 
case of Moldova, the score is as a result of a decline in the recent decade, while 
Georgia showed significant progress over the same period. The score puts both 
countries in the group of hybrid regimes (score between 4 and 6). 
Table 3. EDI data: Georgia, Moldova 
Source: https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/ 
 
Conclusion 
 Georgian post-revolutionary reforms are often described as hard, 
aggressive, painful, and radical. In a short time, the country achieved 
substantial progress in several directions: law enforcement, education, tax 
collection, and the energy sector. Conflict resolution perspectives have 
suffered because of the harsh approach to the corruption that could have been 
taken more easily, viewed rather as "grey" corruption, some experts claim".  
 However, the importance of relations between Georgian and Ossetians 
through illegal routes, such as Ergneti market, was heavily overestimated, 
according to the experts we interviewed.41 These were rather "dens of 
criminals", where all kinds of trade were possible and ordinary citizens, 
villagers were pulled into this swamp of theft and smuggling, making them 
part of international criminal groups.42 The only justified way to deal with this 
kind of challenge is to close routes for illegal, criminal activities. 
 Moldova has not experienced such radical anti-corruption reforms; it 
still has significant problems with the accountability of the state institutions 
                                                        
41 Interview with Roman Gotsiridze. 
42 Some sources gave a dramatic picture of Ossetian population suffering due to these hard 
measures: "The closing of the contraband market deprived South Ossetians not only of 
consumer goods, but also of a source of income. Kokoity used this loss of financial succour 
against Saakashvili, and increased his own popular support (International Crisis Group 2004)" 
(George, 2009). 
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and level of democracy. The Transnistrian conflict is "frozen" and violence-
free not because the Moldovan government has chosen a better approach, but 
rather because being weak it doesn't present a threat to Russian interests. The 
price it pays for not addressing the problem of corruption aggressively can be 
seen in the low scores/evaluations of various international organizations. A 
similar unwillingness and inability to reform the state institutions in the 
Georgian case could cost its independence because through the geographic 
location, Georgia is more vulnerable. 
 International actors have also significantly contributed to the processes 
in both countries during the last two decades. The USA and EU have heavily 
supported anti-corruption reforms in Georgia since 2004. Also, 
democratization and strengthening of state institutions would be impossible 
without various projects implemented with western aid. In Moldova, the 
EUBAM project on the border between Ukraine and Moldova (Transnistria) 
has decreased smuggling and corruption on both sides. Unfortunately, Russia 
remains as a major player in both cases. Supporting separatists in various ways 
(military, economic, political), it is interested in keeping the conflicts "frozen" 
while creating obstacles for democratization and political or economic 
development of Georgia and Moldova. 
 Therefore, in the case of Georgia, and as we argue in case of Moldova 
too, the cost of corruption the country was paying (low reputation on the 
international arena and the region, empty budget, weak state institutions) was 
significantly higher than the hypothetical profit from turning a blind eye on 
corruption, including smuggling on the borders with the secessionist regions. 
The revisionists' argument that corruption is less evil in certain circumstances 
and can be tolerated if there is a profit that can benefit the society is not 
applicable and justified in the cases of South Ossetia and Transnistria.  
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